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et al.:
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TORT
LAW
I. COURT ABOLISHES ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS

In Russo v. Sutton' the South Carolina Supreme Court addressed the
future of common-law torts that have often been referred to as "heart balm"
causes of action. The court prospectively abolished the tort of alienation of
affections2 and refused to abolish retroactively the tort of criminal conversation,3 which was already abolished prospectively by statute.4
Sutton began an affair with Russo's wife in August 1987. Russo
discovered the affair, and after a period of separation he and his wife divorced
in July 1989.1 Russo subsequently obtained a jury verdict against Sutton for
alienation of affections and criminal conversation.6 On appeal to the South
Carolina Supreme Court, Sutton argued that these heart balm causes of action
should be abolished retroactively. 7
The South Carolina Supreme Court recognized that these heart balm torts
"were rooted in antiquated perceptions that wives are chattel of their husbands,
and that the actions survived in hopes that they afforded some protection to
marital relationships. "8 However, the court noted that the availability of these
torts to angry plaintiffs has the potential for great abuse.9 For example, an
opportunity for blackmail exists because the defendant may be willing to pay
the injured spouse simply to prevent the trial publicity of the affair. 10
Consequently, the court elected to abolish prospectively alienation of
affections, stating that the court has "not hesitated to act in the past vhen it
has become apparent that the public policy of the State is offended by outdated
rules of law.""
The court declined to abolish criminal conversation

1. Russo v. Sutton, __ S.C. _, 422 S.E.2d 750 (1992).
2. Id. at
422 S.E.2d at 753.
3. Id. at
, 422 S.E.2d 753-54 n.5.
4. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-150 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991). The statute does not bar
recovery in this case because it applies only to causes of action accruing after June 30, 1988.
In Russo v. Sutton the plaintiff's cause of action arose when the affair began in August 1987.
Russo, _ S.C. at_, 422 S.E.2d at751 n.1.
5. Russo, _
S.C. at _,
422 S.E.2d at 751.
6. Id. The jury awarded damages for alienation of affections and criminal conversation in
the amounts of $30,000 and $50,000 respectively. Id. at _, 422 S.E.2d at 751.
7. Id. at
422 S.E.2d at 751.
8. Id. at
422 S.E.2d at 753 (citing Fundermann v. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790 (Iowa
1981)).
9. Id. at
422 S.E.2d at 753; see also infra text accompanying notes 35-45, discussing
the opportunities these causes of action present for abuse.
10. See, e.g., Wyman v. Wallace, 615 P.2d 452, 455 (Wash. 1980).
11. Russo, __ S.C. at _,
422 S.E.2d at 753.
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retroactively" and thereby left untouched the legislature's prospective
abolition. 13 Because the holding in Russo applied only prospectively, the
court affirmed the jury's verdict. 14
The idea of allowing a husband to seek retribution from his wife's lover
dates back from as early as the ancient Teutonic tribes." Most tribes
required the wife's lover to pay compensation to the husband. 6 Some tribes
17
also authorized the husband to kill either the lover, the wife, or both.
The Anglo-Saxons based actions involving tortious interference with
marriage relations by third persons as actions in trespass." Wives were
considered servants of their husbands, his chattel. 9 Therefore, a husband
could sue the wife's lover for loss of his wife's services, society, and sexual

intercourse. 20
Early English common law established two causes of action for the
interference with marriage relations by a third party.2' The first, enticement,

12. Id. at __, 422 S.E.2d at 753 n.5. The court noted that retroactive application ofjudicial
changes in the common law are well within the scope of its authority; however, it decided not
to exercise those powers in this case. Id. The court did not state a reason.
13. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-150.
14. Id. at _, 422 S.E.2d at 754.
15. Hanover v. Ruch, 809 S.W.2d 893, 894 (Tenn.) (citing Jacob Lippman, The Breakdown
of Consortium, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 651, 654-55 (1930)), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 381 (1991).
16. Hoye v. Hoye, 824 S.W.2d 422, 424 (Ky. 1992). The Teutons believed that adultery
threatened pure blood lines. Id. at 423. Because offspring could only inherit from their father,
the legitimacy of the children was crucial. Id. Consequently, the tribes required compensation
for the husband so that he could purchase a new wife and thereby insure the legitimacy of the his
offspring. Id. at 424.
17. Hanover, 809 S.W.2d at 894.
18. Hoye, 824 S.W.2d at 424. The Anglo-Saxons also required a payment to the husband,
but the amount varied depending on the husband's station in life. Hanover, 809 S.W.2d at 894.
19. Id. In 1818 Lord Byron described "what a wife is worth" in the English judicial system:
[IH]owsoever people fast and pray,
The flesh is frail, and so the soul undone:
What men call gallantry, and gods adultery,
Is much more common where the climate's sultry.
Happy the nations of the moral North!
Where all is
virtue, and the winter season
Sends sin, without a rag on, shivering forth
('Twas snow that brought St. Anthony to reason);
Where juries cast up what a wife is worth,
By laying whate'er sum, in mulct, they please on
The lover, who must pay a handsome price,
Because it is a marketable vice.
Hanover, 809 S.W.2d at 894-95 (quoting Lord Byron, Don Juan, Canto I, LXIII-IV).
20. Hoye, 824 S.W.2d at 424.
21. Id. at 424 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 124, at 917-19 (V. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984); Marshall L. Davidson, III,
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involved inducing a wife to leave her husband. Damages were predicated on
the husband's loss of the wife's services or consortium.'
Enticement
evolved into the tort of alienation of affections. The second cause of action,
seduction, required an adulterous relationship between the plaintiff's wife and
the defendant.' Seduction evolved into the tort of criminal conversation.24
In 1866 New York became the first state to recognize the tort of
alienation of affections.'
Subsequently, every state, except Louisiana,
accepted the tort at common law.26 The passage of Married Women's
Property Acts27 in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries prompted
the majority of courts to extend the right to sue under these torts to the
wife.2" The extension of this right to the wife caused a shift in the rationale
underlying these "heart balm" torts.29 Throughout the twentieth century,
courts have justified the survival of these torts "as means to preserve marital
harmony by deterring wrongful interference."3" For example, in 1962 the
South Carolina Supreme Court stated that "the law is dedicated to ...
protect[ing] the marriage relationship against those who might wrongfully
intrude, even [if] . .. the possibility of reconciliation [is] extremely remote. ""3
As the heart balm torts evolved into devices intended to protect the
institution of marriage, the courts required plaintiffs to prove certain elements
in order to sustain a cause of action. The alienation of affections tort requires
proof of the following: "(1) wrongful conduct on the part of the defendant, (2)

Comment, StealingLove In Tennessee: The Thief Goes Free, 56 TENN. L. REv. 629 (1989)).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Hoye, 824 S.W.2d at 424. Criminal conversation and adultery are considered
synonymous terms. Hanover, 809 S.W.2d at 894 n.1 (citing Turner v. Heavrin, 206 S.W. 23
(Ky. 1918)).
25. Heermance v. James, 47 Barb. 120 (N.Y. App. Div. 1866).
26. KEETON ET AL., supra note 21, § 124. In the United States the courts based the alienation
of affections tort on the same social philosophy adopted by earlier cultures, i.e., that the wife was
no more than a valuable servant of the husband, his chattel. See Dupuis v. Hand, 814 S.W.2d
340, 343 (Tenn. 1991).
27. "These acts granted to women the same rights to own property as men already had,
Courts and legislatures applied the reasoning inherent in these acts and granted the wife a cause
of action against a third party who alienated her husband's affections." Thomas K. Leeper,
Comment, Alienation of Affections: FlourishingAnachronism, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 585,
588 (1977).
28. Hoye v. Hoye, 824 S.W.2d 422, 424 (Ky. 1992).
29. Id.
30. Id. But see Gregory L. Thompson, Note, The Suit of Alienation of Affections: Can Its
Existence Be Justified Today?, 56 N.D. L. REv. 239, 251 (1980) ("The premise that the
existence of the action[s] does help preserve the marital relationship has never been documented.").
31. Fennell v. Littlejohn, 240 S.C. 189, 197, 125 S.E.2d 408, 413 (1962).
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the plaintiff's loss of affection or consortium of the spouse, and (3) a causal
connection between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's loss."32
"[T]he only true affirmative defenses to an alienation of affection suit are
consent by the plaintiff and the statute of limitations, and the action illogically33
ignores all other valid related defenses and all mitigating circumstances."
The tort of criminal conversation requires proof of the following: "(1) an
actual marriage between the spouses and (2) sexual intercourse between the
guilty spouse and the defendant ... . "" The only defenses available to the
by the
defendant in a suit for criminal conversation are outright denial
35 or consent by the plaintiff.36
occurred
conduct
such
that
defendant
Since the 1930's, suits for alienation of affections and criminal conversation have steadily declined with most states abolishing the torts either
legislatively or judicially.37 Washington's Supreme Court judicially abolished

32. Rivers v. Rivers, 292 S.C. 21, 29, 354 S.E.2d 784, 788 (Ct. App. 1987); accord O'Neil
v. Schuckardt, 733 P.2d 693, 696 (Idaho 1986); Hunt v. Hunt, 309 N.W.2d 818, 820 (S.D.
1981).
33. Brief of Appellant at 17. But see Bearbower v. Merry, 266 N.W.2d 128, 130 (Iowa
1978) (stating that the "defendant's lack of knowledge of the existence of the marriage" is a
defense to an action for alienation of affections).
34. Fennell, 240 S.C. at 195, 125 S.E.2d at 412; accordHunt, 309 N.W.2d at 820; Hanover
v. Ruch, 809 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 381 (1991). Note that loss of
affections is not a necessary element of criminal conversation. Fennell, 240 S.C. at 195, 125
S.E.2d at 412.
35. Fadgen v. Lenkner, 365 A.2d 147, 149 (Pa. 1976).
36. Id.; see also Hanover, 809 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tenn. 1991) ("Both knowledge and
acquiescence must be shown to establish consent or connivance."). Prior adulterous conduct by
the plaintiff's spouse with others is not a defense; neither is proof of prior separation or lack of
affections between the plaintiff and the spouse; and neither is a divorce of the plaintiff and the
spouse subsequent to the adultery. Fennell, 240 S.C. at 197, 125 S.E.2d at 413. Moreover,
none of the following are defenses to a suit for criminal conversation: (1) consent by the wife,
(2) lack of knowledge by the defendant that the woman was married, (3) misrepresentations by
the wife as to her marital status, (4) initiation by the wife of the extramarital relationship, (5)
neglect or mistreatment of the wife by her husband, or (6) separation due to some fault of the
husband. Hunt, 309 N.W.2d at 821 (citing Felsenthal v. McMillan, 493 S.W.2d 729, 731 (Tex.
1973).
37. Hoye v. Hoye, 824 S.W.2d 422, 426 (Ky. 1992). Massachusetts rejected alienation of
affections as early as 1890. Dupuis v. Hand, 814 S.W.2d 340, 344 (Tenn. 1991). As the
following summary demonstrates, the alienation of affections tort has been abolished by statute
in 35 states, by law in 4 states, and never recognized in 1 state. Similarly, criminal conversation
has been abolished by statute in 29 states and by the court in 4 states.
Statutes abolishing alienation of affections include the following: ALA. CODE § 6-5-331
(1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-341 (1956); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-106 (MichieSupp.
1991); CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.5 (West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-202 (1987); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572b (West 1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3924 (1974); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-923 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 771.01 (West 1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-17
(1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-4-1 (Bums 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-208 (1988); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 167 (West 1964); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 3-103 (1991);
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the tort of alienation of affections emphasizing that because "the action was
created judicially, the courts have the power to resolve [the] question" of
whether or not it should be abolished.38 The Washington Supreme Court
stated the following reasons for abolishing the tort:
(1)The underlying assumption of preserving marital harmony is erroneous;
(2) The judicial process is not sufficiently capable of policing the often
vicious out-of-court settlements; (3) The opportunity for blackmail is great
since the mere bringing of an action could ruin a defendant's reputation;
(4) There are no helpful standards for assessing damages; and (5) The
successful plaintiff succeeds in compelling what appears to be a forced sale
39
of the spouse's affections.

MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 207, § 47B (West 1987); MICH. COmP. LAws ANN. § 600.2901
(West 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 553.02 (West 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-601 (1991);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-21, 188 (1989); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41.380 (Michie 1986); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:23-1 (West 1987); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 80-a (McKinney 1992); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-02-06 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.29 (Anderson 1991); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 76, § 8.1 (West 1987); OR. REV.STAT. § 30.840 (1988); 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 1901 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-42 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-701 (1991);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.06 (West 1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1001 (1989); VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-220 (Michie 1992); W. VA. CODE § 56-3-2a (Supp. 1993); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 768.01 (West 1993); Wyo. STAT. § 1-23-101 (1977).
Courts abolishing the alienation of affections tort are as follows: O'Neil v. Schuckardt, 733
P.2d 693 (Idaho 1986); Fundermann v. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790 (Iowa 1981) (en bane);

Hoye v. Hoye, 824 S.W.2d 422 (Ky. 1992); Wyman v. Wallace, 615 P.2d 452 (Wash. 1980)
(en banc).
Louisiana has never recognized the tort of alienation of affections. See Moulin v.
Monteleone, 115 So. 447 (La. 1927), overruled on other grounds by 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v.
Spurney, 538 So. 2d 228 (La. 1989).
Statutes abolishing the tort of criminal conversation include the following: ALA. CODE § 65-331 (1975); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-106 (Michie Supp. 1991); CAL. Civ. CODE § 43.5
(West 1982); COLO. REv.STAT. § 13-20-202 (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572f (West
1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3924 (1974); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-923 (1989); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 771.01 (West 1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-17 (1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-4-1
(Bums 1986); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.2901 (West 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 553.02
(West 1988); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21, 188 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.380 (Michie
1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23-1 (West 1987); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 80-a (McKinney
1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02-06 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.29 (Anderson
1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76, § 8.1 (West Supp. 1987); OR. REv. STAT. § 30.850 (1988);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-42 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-150 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-508 (1991); TEXAS FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.05 (West 1986); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1001 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-220 (Michie 1992); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 768.01 (West 1993); Wyo. STAT. § 1-23-101 (1977).
Courts abolishing the tort of criminal conversation include the following: Bearbower v.
Merry, 266 N.W.2d 128 (Iowa 1978) (en banc); Fadgen v. Lenkner, 365 A.2d 147 (Pa. 1976);
Hunt v. Hunt, 309 N.W.2d 818 (S.D. 1981); Norton v. Macfarlane, 818 P.2d 8 (Utah 1991).
38. Wyman v. Wallace, 615 P.2d 452, 454 (Wash. 1980) (en bane).
39. Id. at 455 (cited with approval in O'Neil v. Schuckardt, 733 P.2d 693, 697 (Idaho 1986);
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The Washington court further recognized that "'a viable marriage is not
one where the "mental attitude" of one spouse towards the other is susceptible
to interference by an outsider.'"4 According to the Idaho Supreme Court,
another reason for abolishing the tort is that these suits may expose minor
children to the extramarital affairs of their parents and might require the
children to testify.4 1 The court noted further that sympathetic juries may
award excessive damages and unjustified verdicts for the plaintiff.42
When the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania abolished the tort of criminal
conversation, it remarked that "the cause of action itself is an anachronism."43 The South Dakota Supreme Court abolished the criminal conversation tort, stating:
[C]riminal conversation, as [a] viable legal remed[y], [is an] outmoded
archaic holdover from an era when wives were considered the chattel of
their spouse rather than distinct legal entities. Wives are not property.
Neither are husbands. The love and affection of a human being who is
devoted to another human being is not susceptible to theft. There are
simply too many intangibles which defy the concept that love is proper4
ty.

4

The South Dakota Supreme Court recognized that the tort "generally exposes
the marriage to a public cleansing with a price tag attached upon it."'45 The
Supreme Court of Tennessee held that it had a duty to abolish criminal
conversation "because the action is founded upon a property-based theory
which has no place in contemporary society, because the social harm it causes
far outweighs any justification for its existence, and because the Legislature

Dupuis v. Hand, 814 S.W.2d 340, 345 (Tenn. 1991); Hunt v. Hunt, 309 N.W.2d 818, 822 (S.D.
1981) (holding in each case that these reasons justify abolition of the alienation of affections

tort)).
In Russo, the South Carolina Supreme Court indicates that the alienation of affections tort
was abolished in South Dakota by Hunt v. Hunt. 422 S.E.2d at 753 n.3. The court in Hunt voted
2-3 in favor of abolishing the tort; therefore, the tort was actually retained in South Dakota.
Justice Henderson wrote an opinion supporting the abolition of the alienation of affections tort,
but he was joined by only one justice. Three justices concurred with Justice Henderson's result,
but they did not support abolishing the tort. Hunt, 309 N.W.2d at 822-23.
40. Wynwn, 615 P.2d at 455 (quoting Wyman v. Wallace, 549 P.2d 71, 74 (Wash. Ct. App.
1976)); see also Fundermann v. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790, 791 (Iowa 1981) (en bane)
("Human experience is that the affections of persons who are devoted and faithful are not
susceptible to larceny-no matter how cunning or stealthful.").
41. O'Neil, 733 P.2d at 698 (citing Thompson, supra note 30, at 254).
42. Id.
43. Fadgen v. Lenkner, 365 A.2d 147, 151 (Pa. 1976).
44. Hunt v. Hunt, 309 N.W.2d 818, 821 (S.D. 1981) (footnote omitted).

All justices

concurred that criminal conversation should be abolished, but some felt that such action should
be left to the legislature. Id. at 823.
45. Id. at 822.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss1/16
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has declared the action to be against public policy." 46 The Supreme Court
of Utah abolished criminal conversation partly because47 the tort imposed total
liability on only one person for the act of two people.
The plaintiffs in most of these cases argued that the doctrine of stare
decisis required the courts to retain both causes of action. The courts,
however, did not see the doctrine as a bar to abolishing the torts. For
example, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania emphasized that while stare
decisis "is a wise course of judicial action, it is not an ironclad rule and is to
be controlling only where applicable. "48 Then the court remarked: "[W]hen
it is determined that a past precedent is no longer in accord with modem
realities, and the rationale justifying the old rule no longer finds support, then
the pledge to certainty gives way 'to new conditions and to the persuasion of
superior reasoning.'"'" The Tennessee Supreme Court noted that "mindless
obedience to [stare decisis] can confound the search for truth and foster an
attitude of contempt."50
The Russo v. Sutton opinion raises two interesting questions in light of
previous decisions from the South Carolina courts. First, one may question
why the court abolished alienation of affections at all in light of Albertini v.
Veal 1 and the statute abolishing criminal conversation. 2 In Albertini, the
South Carolina Court of Appeals discussed at length the archaic nature of
criminal conversation; however, it declined to abolish the tort and never even
discussed the possibility of such judicial action. 53 Arguably the court did not
abolish the tort because the issue was not directly before it. In the alternative,
perhaps the court of appeals believed any decision to abolish a common-law
rule in South Carolina should come from the highest court of the state or
perhaps even the legislature. However, the Russo v. Sutton decision suggests
that the South Carolina Supreme Court was not concerned with deference to
the legislature because the legislature expressly provided for an action for
4
alienation of affections when it abolished criminal conversation in 1988.5

46. Hanover v. Ruch, 809 S.W.2d 893, 894 (Tenn.) (abolishing criminal conversation
retroactively after the Tennessee Legislature abolished it prospectively), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
381 (1991).
47. Norton v. Macfarlane, 818 P.2d 8, 16 (Utah 1991).
48. Fadgen v. Lenkner, 365 A.2d 147, 152 (Pa. 1976).
49. Id. (quoting Griffith v. United Air Lines, 203 A.2d 796, 806 (Pa. 1964)); see also
Fundermann v. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790, 793 (Iowa 1981) (en banc) (noting that courts have
a "'duty to monitor and interpret the common law, and to abandon antiquated doctrines and
concepts'"(quoting Bearbower v. Merry, 266 N.W.2d 128, 129 (Iowa 1978) (en banc))).
50. Davis v. Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753, 758 (Tenn. 1983); see also Hanover v. Ruch, 809
S.W.2d 893, 898 (Tenn.) ("'Where the reason fails the rule should not apply.'"(quoting Brown
v. Selby, 332 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1960))), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 381 (1991).
51. 292 S.C. 561, 357 S.E.2d 716 (Ct. App. 1987) (per curiam).
52. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-150 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
53. Albertini, 292 S.C. at 565 & n.2, 357 S.E.2d at 719 & n.2.
54. See Act of March 21, 1988, No. 391, 1988 S.C. Acts 2783 (abolishing criminal

Published by Scholar Commons, 1993

7

1993]

South Carolina LawTORT
Review,
Vol. 45, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 16
LAW

In fact, the court did not even mention its disregard of the legislature's recent
decision to retain the cause of action for alienation of affections. 5
The second curious aspect of the court's opinion is its decision to act
only prospectively. In the past the court has abolished laws both prospectively
and retroactively. For example, in McCall v. Batsor5 6 the court prospectively abolished sovereign immunity except for those situations where the government's authority is discretionary; the court found that the doctrine was
antiquated. 57 The court specifically noted that "[o]ther states have recognized
the potential problems and have abolished sovereign immunity prospectively."58 If the court was following the lead of other jurisdictions by abolishing
sovereign immunity only prospectively, then the court's decision in Russo
seems inconsistent with such a line of reasoning. All but one of the jurisdictions abolishing either alienation of affections or criminal conversation have
abolished these torts retroactively. 9 One may question why the South
Carolina Supreme Court chose not to follow the direction of almost every
other court in this area. In both Hanover and Dupuis,61 the court chose
conversation but retaining alienation of affections).
55. In Norton v. Macfarlane, 818 P.2d 8 (Utah 1991), the plaintiff argued that the court
should show deference to the legislature before abolishing criminal conversation and not act
where the legislature has chosen not to act. Id. at 17-18. The court responded by stating "that
the general rule of deference to the legislative intenthas no application here, where the legislature
has expressed no intent that the cause of action be retained." Id. at 18 (citing Feldman v.
Feldman, 480 A.2d 34, 35 (N.H. 1984)). Following this general rule, the South Carolina
Supreme Court should have declined to abolish'alienation of affections in light of the legislature's
express decision to retain the cause of action.
56. 285 S.C. 243, 329 S.E.2d 741 (1985).
57. Id. at 245, 329 S.E.2d at 742.
58. Id. at 246, 329 S.E.2d at 742.
59. See O'Neil v. Schuckardt, 733 P.2d 693 (Idaho 1986) (abolishing alienation of affections
and ruling that the jury's award of damages for that cause of action could not stand); Fundermann
v. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790 (Iowa 1981) (en banc) (abolishing alienation of affections and
reversing the lower court's judgment for the plaintiff); Hoye v. Hoye, 824 S.W.2d 422 (Ky.
1992) (abolishing both alienation of affections and criminal conversation and reversing the
judgment for the plaintiff); Fadgen v. Lenkner, 365 A.2d 147 (Pa. 1976) (abolishing criminal
conversation with directions to the lower court to vacate the judgment for the plaintiff); Hunt v.
Hunt, 309 N.W.2d 818 (S.D. 1981) (abolishing criminal conversation and reversing the lower
court's judgment for the plaintiff); Dupuis v. Hand, 814 S.W.2d 340 (Tenn. 1991) (abolishing
alienation of affections retroactively); Hanover v. Ruch, 809 S.W.2d 893 (Tenn.) (abolishing
criminal conversationretroactively), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 381 (1991); Norton v. Macfarlane,
818 P.2d 8 (Utah 1991) (abolishing criminal conversation and ordering a dismissal of the cause
of action); Wyman v. Wallace, 615 P.2d 452 (Wash. 1980) (en banc) (abolishing alienation of
affections and reversing the trial court's judgment for the plaintiff). But see Treiber v. Hess, 782
S.W.2d 43 (Ark. 1990) (recognizing judicial power to abolish alienation of affections
retroactively but declining to do so because the legislature had already prospectively abolished
it); Bearbower v. Merry, 266 N.W.2d 128 (Iowa 1978) (en banc) (abolishing criminal
conversation only prospectively).
60. 809 S.W.2d at 898.
61. 814 S.W.2d at 346.
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to abolish both the criminal conversation tort and alienation of affections tort
even though the legislature had already abolished both torts prospectively. In
Hanover the plaintiff argued that the statute deprived the court of the power
to abolish criminal conversation actions prior to the effective date of the
statute.62 The court rejected this argument stating that "retroactive application of judicial changes in the common law is a unique feature of common law
adjudication. "63 Moreover, the court responded: "[W]e abdicate our own
function, in a field peculiarly non-statutory, when we refuse to consider an old
and court-made rule."'
In Hossenlopp v. Cannon,' the South Carolina Supreme Court abolished
the common-law dog-bite rule, which essentially gave every dog one free bite.
In other words, an owner was not liable for a dog's first bite because the
owner did not have knowledge of the dog's dangerous propensities until that
first bite occurred.6 6 The court noted that "[tihe time has come when our
rule must give way to the more commonly accepted rule of law indicated in
other states by both case law and by statute."67 In conclusion, the court held
that "[a]il cases heretofore decided by this Court inconsistent with the view
herein expressed are hereby overruled." 6" The issue before the court in
Russo seems particularly on point with the issue in Hossenlopp, yet the court
chose a different course of action by declining to act retroactively. In both
cases the court confronted outdated common-law doctrines. The court chose
different approaches but gave no explanation for its decision to act only
prospectively in Russo. One possible explanation is that the court did not want
to abolish retroactively a tort which the South Carolina Legislature had
recently ratified. However, the court was obviously not overly concerned with
legislative deference because it did indeed abolish the tort.
In the United States, the modern trend is to constantly chip away at heart
balm torts, which will probably become extinct in the not so distant future.
The South Carolina Supreme Court acted accordingly by abolishing alienation
of affections in Russo v. Sutton. The court does seem to have taken a step
backwards, however, by refusing to abolish criminal conversation and alienation of affections retroactively.
Elizabeth Herlong Campbell

62. Hanover, 809 S.W.2d at 895.
63. Id. at 896 n.3.
64. Id. at 896 (quoting Kilboume v. Hanzelik, 648 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tenn. 1983)).
65. 285 S.C. 367, 329 S.E.2d 438 (1985).
66. Id. at 371, 329 S.E.2d at 440.
67. Id. at 371, 329 S.E.2d at 441.
68. Id. at 372, 329 S.E.2d at 441.
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